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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103(h) 2002 as amended, confers original 
jurisdiction over this appeal which is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce rendered in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Restatement of Appellant's Issue #1 
Did the trial court fail to consider what it was awarding Sherrie Eloff as 
child support in determining her monthly shortfall and need for alimony? 
Standard of Review 
Alimony determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Griffith v. 
Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 260 (Utah 1999); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000); Jensen v. Bowcutt, 892, P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Trial courts have 
considerable discretion in determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, 
and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is 
demonstrated. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Issue #2 
Has the Appellant marshaled all the evidence in support of the lower court's 
alimony findings before claiming they are not supported by the weight of 
the credible evidence? 
1 
Standard of Review 
Appellate Courts will not address a challenge to a finding of a lower court unless 
the Appellant has appropriately "marshaled the evidence55. See State v. Benvenuto, 372 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1999); Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998); and 
Whitear v. Labor Comm }n, 973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Marshaling the 
evidence first entails marshaling or listing all the evidence supporting the finding that is 
challenged. See Tingeyv. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 11 (Utah 1999); 
Benvenuto, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4 (Utah 1999); State ex rel T.J, 945 P.2d 158, 164 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); and In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). See also Rule 24(a)(9) U.R.A.P. which states: 
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding.55 
Once the evidence is listed or marshaled with appropriate citation to the record, the 
Appellant must then show that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support 
the findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the 
decision. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d at 433; Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d at 1217; and 
ELM, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). If the 
Appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, the Appellate Courts must assume the 
findings are correct. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d at 312 (Utah 1998); Johnson v. 
Higley, 977 P.2d at 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
2 
Issue #3 
Did the lower court publish findings of fact on all the component parts of 
the alimony issue the law requires? Did the court explain its computation 
method adequately? 
Standard of Review 
Alimony determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Griffith v. 
Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 260 (Utah 1999); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000). Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and property 
distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). Although the Court must make an explicit finding on each of the Jones 
factors, and explain how it arrived at the monthly alimony award, the court need not 
resolve in its findings every fact dispute concerning either party's claimed needs or ability 
to produce income. Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES BELOW 
The Appellee Sherrie Eloff (hereinafter referred to as "Sherrie") disagrees with 
Appellant's statement about preservation. She acknowledges the alimony claim and all 
the Jones factors were litigated in detail at trial. However there is a pending Motion for 
Summary Disposition in which she alleges this case should be summarily dismissed. 
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On November 21st, 2007, Sherrie filed a Motion for Summary Disposition with 
the Court. In the Motion, she asked the Court to dismiss Bruce Eloff s (hereinafter 
referred to as "Mr. Eloff) appeal which had been filed on October 19th, 2007. The 
grounds for her motion were that the Decree of Divorce had been signed on July 19th, 
2007, and the Appellant did not file his Notice of Appeal until October 19th, 2007, 92 
(ninety-two) days later. 
Mr. Eloff responded and alleged that he had filed a Rule 52(b) Motion which 
extended the time for filing an appeal until the motion was resolved. The problem, which 
was pointed out to the Court in the motion, was that what Mr. Eloff called a Rule 52(b) 
motion, and the pleading which was captioned by him as a "52(b) Motion'5 does not meet 
the criteria for Rule 52(b). Rule 52(b) states that 
"Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accordingly." 
Separately, the Rules provide for an extension of time in which to file an appeal while a 
52(b) motion is pending. 
Sherrie, the Appellee herein, argued then, and argues now, that the Motion for 
Clarification did not ask the District Court to amend its findings or to make additional 
findings, and therefore was not a Rule 52(b) motion, and therefore did not extend the time 
in which to file an appeal. Mr. Eloff s Motion for Clarification did not request a change 
in the outcome, and did not suggest that the lower court had made erroneous findings or 
4 
inadequate findings. 
This is not a mere allegation that the caption of the motion was inadequate, this is 
an argument that in substance, the motion did not request Rule 52(b) relief. 
The ruling on Sherrie's Motion was that it was denied, but the Court stated: 
"It is hereby ordered that the motion for summary disposition is denied, and 
a ruling on the issues raised therein is deferred pending plenary presentation 
and consideration of the appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 10." [Emphasis 
added] 
Sherrie requests that upon plenary review in connection with the briefing process, 
the Court determine that the issue of the Court's findings concerning alimony have not 
been preserved, and have been lost for failure to file a timely appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Appellee agrees with the Appellants statements concerning the nature of the 
case. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Appellee agrees with the Appellant's statements concerning the course of the 
proceedings below. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
The Appellee agrees with the Appellant's statements concerning the disposition in 
the court below. 
5 
Sherrie believes Mr. Eloff states most of the facts concerning the court's ruling 
and findings about alimony correctly. He however mischaracterizes the court's findings 
and reasoning concerning Sherrie's income, her reasonable needs, and its affect on the 
calculation of her monthly shortfall. Judge Medley was concise and clear in explaining 
his reasoning and making his findings. Rather than summarize what he said and did, 
Sherrie offers a portion of the transcript of the Judge's ruling as her: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"THE COURT: I'm going to immediately to the issue of alimony and 
this is how I have resolved that particular issue. First of all, I'd like to state 
for the record that I have considered all of the required Jones factors. I've 
obviously also taken into consideration how these parties are respectively 
employed. Additionally, I've taken into consideration the age of these 
parties and I — I've also taken into consideration and this Court has in fact 
found that this is in fact, a long term marriage. 
Based upon the evidence presented, Counsel, I have found, for 
alimony purposes, the petitioner's gross income to be in the approximate 
amount of $3.137. Additionally, based upon the evidence presented, I have 
also found, and obviously, I have made some adjustments, but I have found 
that the petitioner's reasonable and necessary expenses are in the 
approximate total amount of $3,461; consequently, I am finding that 
petitioner does have a shortfall in the amount of $324. So. she does have 
that amount of unmet need. 
Additionally, for alimony purposes, I am finding that the respondent 
has gross income in the approximate amount of $6,760 and that he has 
reasonable monthly expenses in the approximate amount of $4,372. So, I 
am finding that the respondent has the ability to pay alimony: consequently. 
I'm awarding the petitioner alimony in this case in the amount of $324. 
consistent with the standard limitations and restrictions and by that, I simply 
mean subject to remarriage, cohabitation, for the duration of the term of the 
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parties' marriage. . . ." 
"MR. READING: Yeah. Okay. And your Honor, at this point, a 
clarification. Back to the alimony issue, you mentioned that the petitioner 
had $3,137, that included, I guess, the child support? 
MR. McPHIE: No. 
THE COURT: No. I did not include that child support in the 
calculation and I cited it as a gross amount of her income. 
MR. READING: And - and so that was not taken into account to help 
pay those expenses? 
THE COURT: It was taken into account, but it was not included by 
me as income for alimony purposes." [Emphasis added]] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue #1. The trial court did not make the mistake Appellant claims. Judge 
Medley did consider the child support income Sherrie Eloff would be receiving in 
calculating her need for alimony. The Judge said so. 
Issue #2. Judge Medley explained in his ruling that he had considered the child 
support income Sherrie Eloff would be receiving in setting the alimony award. Claims 
that he didn't, when he clearly stated that he did, must be treated as a claim that the court 
is intentionally misdirecting us, or, that his findings are unsupported by the weight of the 
credible evidence. 
1
 Taken from the transcript of the Court's Ruling attached to Appellant's Brief as 
Addendum A, starting on page 4 and 5, and then skipping to page 12. 
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Mr. Eloff does not claim the trial court is being disingenuous, but he does not 
marshal all, or any of the evidence in the record in support of the Judge's alimony 
findings, or any other conclusion. "If the appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, 
the Appellate Courts must assume the findings are correct." See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 312 (Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Issue #3. The court made findings of fact on all the elements of alimony that it 
is required to make. The Jones2 factors, and others which the trial court considered, are 
codified in Section 30-3-5(8)(a) U.C.A. The court also explained the method it used to 
get from the facts to its conclusion on alimony. Additional findings resolving fact 
disputes concerning the component sub-parts leading to these alimony findings are not 
required. Rehn v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
ARGUMENT 
Issue #1 
No. The trial Court did not fail to consider the child support it was awarding 
Sherrie in setting the alimony. 
The court stated in its Ruling made on the telephone (a transcript of which is 
attached to the Appellant's Brief as Addendum A, the following: 
MR. READING: Yeah. Okay. And your Honor, at this point, a 
2
 Set forth in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
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clarification. Back to the alimony issue, you mentioned that the petitioner 
had $3,137, that included, I guess, the child support? 
MR. McPHIE: No. 
THE COURT: No. I did not include that child support in the 
calculation and I cited it as a gross amount of her income. 
MR. READING: And — and so that was not taken into account to help 
pay those expenses? 
THE COURT: It was taken into account but it was not included by 
me as income for alimony purposes." [Emphasis added] 
Mr. Eloff cannot argue that the Court did not consider the child support it was 
awarding Sherrie just because the Court did not include it in her gross income from 
employment. His finding concerning her gross income was the figure that the parties had 
stipulated at the beginning of trial was her gross income. 
Appellant argues both that there was a failure to consider, and separately a failure 
to make adequate findings. Neither is true. The court specifically said that it had 
considered the child support, and said that "It was taken into account." 
What then are we left with? The Appellant is not claiming that the trial court 
misdirected us. His claim of inadequate findings is dealt with as a separate issue in both 
his Brief and this one. Appellant doesn't want to say the findings are not supported by 
the weight of the credible evidence, because then he must marshal the evidence. But that 
is what he is saying. 
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Issue #2 
No. The Appellant has not marshaled all or any of the evidence in support of the 
court's finding, or any other position. 
The court's findings are supported by the weight of the credible evidence. If the 
Appellant claims they are not, he has the duty of marshaling all of the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the court's finding, and then show that in spite of that evidence, the 
contradictory evidence clearly outweighs it. 
Specifically, cases such as Tingey v. Christensen,3 State v. Benvenuto,4 State ex rel 
T.J.,5 and In re Estate of Hamilton? the courts have said that marshaling the evidence first 
entails marshaling or listing all of the evidence supporting the finding that is challenged. 
The courts have gone on to say in Child v. Gonda,7 Johnson v. Higley* ELM Inc. 
v. M.T. Enterprises Inc.,9 that once the evidence is listed or marshaled with appropriate 
citation to the record, the Appellant must then show that the marshaled evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light 
3
 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 11 (Utah 1999) 
4
 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1999) 
5
 945 P.2d 158, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
6
 869 P.2d 971, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
7
 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998) 
8
 977 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
9
 968 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
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most favorable to the decision. 
The Appellant has not met his burden, and has not done his duty. 
Starting with State v. Benvenuto,10 Child v. Gonda,u and Whitear v. Labor 
Comm 'n,12 the Utah Appellate Courts have, in unison, said that "Appellate Courts will not 
address a challenge to a finding of a lower court unless the Appellant has appropriately 
marshaled the evidence." 
Lastly, our Courts of Appeal have said in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald13 and Johnson v. 
Higley,14 that if an Appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, the Appellate Courts 
must assume that the findings are correct. 
The Appellant has not cited the court to a single piece of evidence in support of or 
in opposition to the court's findings. Therefore, the court should "not address a challenge 
to the findings. As stated in Valcarce and Johnson cited above, "the court must assume 
the findings are correct." 
Issue #3 
Yes. The lower court made findings on all the component parts of the alimony 
330 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1999) 
972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998) 
973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) 
977 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
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issue as set forth in Jones v. Jones15 and Rehn v. Rehn,16 and Section 30-3-5(8)(a) U.C.A. 
and explained its method. Findings resolving sub-component fact disputes about claimed 
monthly expenses and/or what should be considered as income, are not required. 
Although the Jones v. Jones case and its progeny are still good law and provide 
detail, largely the factors which must be considered by the court in setting alimony are 
now codified. In Section 30-3-5(8)(a) U.C.A. it states: 
"The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouses5 skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage." 
As is set forth in Judge Medley's ruling which is quoted verbatim as Sherrie's 
Statement of Facts, the Court stated: 
"I'd like to state for the record that I have considered all of the required 
Jones factors. I've obviously also taken into consideration how these 
parties are respectively employed. Additionally, I've taken into 
consideration the age of these parties and I — I've also taken into 
consideration and this Court has in fact found that this is in fact, a long term 
marriage." 
15
 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) 
16
 974 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
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The trial court also made findings concerning the fact that the parties had children, 
and based on the stipulation of the parties, the court awarded custody to Sherrie. 
The trial court then found that for alimony purposes, Sherrie's gross income was 
$3,137 per month. The court then found that it needed to make adjustments in her 
claimed expenses, but found that she had reasonable and necessary expenses of $3,461 
per month. The court then found that she had a monthly shortfall of $324, and that 
amount was her unmet need. 
The trial court also found that Mr. Eloff s admission made at trial that he had gross 
income of $6,760 per month, i.e. $511 more per month gross than had been claimed on 
his Financial Declaration filed the day before,17 and that his reasonable and necessary 
monthly expenses were $4,372. Mr. Eloff had claimed his net pay per month was 
$4,766.20 on $511 less gross pay the day before. The court found that Mr. Eloff had the 
ability to pay alimony and consequently awarded Sherrie monthly alimony in the amount 
of$324. 
The court made findings on all of the Jones, Rehn and other factors cited in other 
cases which are now largely codified in Section 30-3-5(8)(a) U.C.A. There were no 
issues about one spouse working in the other's business, or whether one spouse had 
worked while the other obtained an education. 
17
 See the Financial Declaration of Mr. Eloff dated June 11th 2007 which was admitted at 
trial as Petitioner's Exhibit 5, and which is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
IS 
The court explained which numbers it was adding and subtracting to determine 
each spouse's income and need and explained that the alimony it was awarding was no 
more than the unmet need, and no more than the ability to pay. 
The Appellant relies heavily on two cases, i.e. Andrus v. Andrusn and Bingham v. 
Bingham19 for the premise that the trial court's findings are inadequate. 
The Andrus divorce case was decided by this court in September of 2007. Mr. 
Andrus alleged that the trial court abused its discretion by calculating his alimony 
obligation based on his gross monthly income instead of his net monthly income. 
Specifically the husband claimed that the trial court improperly ignored his duty to pay 
taxes and thereby mistakenly overestimated the "ability of the payor spouse to provide 
income."20 
In Andrus, alimony was set without any finding by the court as to what Mr. 
Andrus' tax obligations were. This court determined on appeal that the trial court had not 
provided enough detail concerning what "the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support" was. 
In the instant case, Mr. Eloff does not claim that he does not have enough money 
to pay the alimony the court awarded. Mr. Eloff does not claim that his gross pay minus 
18
 169 P.3d 754, 759 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) 
19
 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
20
 The alimony factor the court was considering as set forth in § 30-3-5(8)(a) U.C.A. 
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his reasonable deductions for taxes, etc. leave him with insufficient net pay to pay the 
alimony the court ordered. 
A day before the trial, Mr. Eloff filed a Financial Declaration which is attached to 
this Brief as Addendum C. In that Financial Declaration he claimed that his gross 
monthly income was $65248.66 per month, and that he had deductions from gross of 
$1,482.46 (incorrect calculation) resulting in net pay per month of $4,766.20. This was 
his best case scenario. This was allowing him all the deductions from his pay he claimed. 
Based on $4,766.20 per month as net pay and the reduced amount the court allowed him 
as his reasonable and necessary monthly expenses of $4,372, Mr. Eloff had more than 
enough to pay the $324.00 per month in alimony the court ordered.21 
However, the next day when Mr. Eloff appeared at trial, the first thing the parties 
informed the court of was that they had a stipulation concerning the parties' gross 
incomes. Mr. Eloff, through counsel, then stipulated that his gross income was $6,760 
per month or $511 higher income per month than the gross incbme he had claimed on his 
Financial Declaration filed the day before. When he was questioned about this by counsel 
at trial, he claimed that his net income was not $511 higher because he also paid tax on 
the additional $511 per month, but had no idea how much the tax on the additional $511 
per month was.22 Clearly Mr. Eloff had the ability to pay the alimony the court ordered 
21
 $4,766.20 - $4,372 = $394.20. The alimony ordered was $324.00. 
22
 See the Record at page 598, and the transcript which follows page 93 line 20 through 
page 95 line 5. Copies of these pages are attached hereto as Addendum D. 
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him to pay under either scenario. 
In Andrus, Mr. Andrus claimed that he literally could not pay the alimony because 
after taxes, he didn't have the ability. Mr. Eloff does not make that claim. 
Mr. Eloff s reliance on the Andrus case is, as a theoretical proposition only, not a 
real claim. He admitted at trial that he had enough net pay to pay the alimony awarded. 
His attack on the court's findings for failure to make a finding concerning his net pay, is a 
bad faith attack on the court's findings, and a disingenuous attempt to make an issue 
where there isn't one. If the Court had made a finding concerning Mr. Eloff s net pay, 
and it had been the finding Mr. Eloff encouraged the court to make, i.e. his best case 
scenario, the resulting alimony would still be warranted. Mr. Eloff has the ability to pay. 
Secondly, the Appellant relies on Bingham v. Bingham.23 Mr. and Mrs. Bingham 
divorced in 1994 after a 21 year marriage. Alimony was awarded to Mrs. Bingham. Mr. 
Bingham appealed. Mr. Bingham claimed that the trial court erroneously determined his 
income available to pay child support and alimony as being too high. Mr. Bingham was a 
dairy-man. He worked at a corporation he solely owned, known as Bingham Dairy. 
Mr. Bingham's personal gross income was the gross income of Bingham Dairy 
minus the dairy's necessary expenses as defined under the (pre- recodification) Utah 
Code Section 78-45-7.5(4)(a). The dairy had outstanding corporate loans, and had made 
cash purchases of assets. Mr. Bingham argued that both should have been deducted from 
23
 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
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the dairy's gross income as necessary expenses for the business before determining his 
personal gross income. 
The trial court ruled that Mr. Bingham corporate payments of principal on certain 
loans were not necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operations, 
and included those payments in the computation of his personal gross income. 
This court stated that it did not believe the trial court had erred in its application of 
the statute's general language which allows deduction of "only those expenses necessary 
to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level." The court found that Mr. Bingham 
was in a position to manipulate the payments on the loans since many of the payments on 
the loans were to himself and/or his father. Additionally, there was no specific scheduled 
pay back period. The trial court found that the principal payments served primarily to 
increase Bingham Dairy's value by decreasing its liabilities, and thus were not routine 
operating expenses. 
Mr. Eloff is a salaried employee. His personal gross income is easily documented. 
The trial court in the instant case did not need to consider the question of what expenses 
are necessary to allow a business to operate at a reasonable level. 
In Bingham, the trial court awarded Mrs. Bingham $1,431.76 in child support and 
$1,750.00 in permanent alimony. The lower court had awarded Mrs. Bingham $701.76 
per month more than her monthly unmet financial need. The trial court in Bingham 
offered no explanation for why it was giving Mrs. Bingham $701.76 more than her 
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monthly shortfall. This court concluded that the trial court should not have awarded the 
Plaintiff more than her established monthly shortfall as alimony, even though Mr. 
Bingham had the ability to pay more, without a specific finding as to why. 
The Bingham case is irrelevant to the instant case because the Court has not made 
an award of excess alimony. The $324.00 per month alimony figure that the trial court 
awarded Sherrie is exactly the difference between what it found to be Sherrie's 
reasonable and necessary monthly expenses, and the monthly resources with which she 
could meet those obligations. Specifically, the court stated: 
"Based upon the evidence presented, Counsel, I have found, for alimony 
purposes, the petitioner's gross income to be in the approximate amount of 
$3,137. Additionally, based on the evidence presented, 1 have also found, 
and obviously, I have made some adjustments, but I have found that the 
petitioner's reasonable and necessary expenses are in the approximate total 
amount of $3,461; consequently, I am finding that petitioner does have a 
shortfall in the amount of $324. So, she does have that amount of unmet 
need." 24 
In 1999, this court decided the case of Rehn v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). Rehn ties together the court's often-expressed opinion that the court "must make 
detailed findings on all material issues, i.e. the Jones factors, which should include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was 
reached," and the other often repeated court statement that "while the trial court did not 
expressly articulate which expenses it used to arrive at the alimony award, there is no 
Transcript of Ruling, attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum A. 
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requirement that the Court make such a finding." Rehn also states that "the court must 
explain how it arrived at the monthly alimony figure, or at least from the record, allow us 
to make this determination ourselves." 
Rehn deals with these requirements together. Taken as a whole, Rehn stands for 
the proposition that a trial court must make a finding on the factors outlined in Section 
30-3-5(8)(e) U.C.A. and must explain the arithmetic well enough to show that the 
alimony ordered is the recipient's reasonable and necessary unmet monthly need and that 
the amount is within the obligor's ability to pay. 
Judge Medley clearly considered the Jones and other factors outlined in Section 
30-3-5(8) of the Utah Code on alimony. The trial court explained how it did the 
calculations, and that it found what exactly what Sherrie's reasonable unmet need per 
month was, and that Mr. Eloff had money with which he could pay that alimony. The 
amount he ordered in alimony was no more than Sherrie's unmet need and no more than 
Mr. Eloff s ability to pay. 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Eloff does not challenge the court's acceptance of 
the parties' stipulation concerning his gross income, or criticize the Judge's reduction of 
his claimed monthly expenses. Nowhere does Mr. Eloff state that the court improperly 
concluded that he had more than enough ability to meet his own needs. Mr. Eloff does 
not claim that his was not a long-term marriage. He does not dispute that his income was 
stipulated to be more than double what Sherrie's income was. Mr. Eloff does not point 
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out that the expenses the court allowed him after reduction for one person were still 
$4,372, whereas Sherrie's reasonable and necessary expenses allowed by the court for her 
and two children were only $3,461. 
If the standard of review is "abuse of discretion" as is stated in Jensen v. Bowcutt15 
and other cases, and if the trial court's considerable discretion in determining alimony and 
property distribution in divorce cases will be upheld on appeal "unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated" (Howell v. Howell26), one has to ask 
where is the clear abuse of discretion? The lower court awarded a woman $324.00 a 
month in alimony when her husband's gross income after long-term marriage was double 
what bet income was i.e. $6,760 versus $3,137. The trial court had already allowed her 
husband claimed expenses of $4,372 and her only claimed expenses of $3,461 for her and 
two children. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in fixing alimony. The court 
should deny the appeal, and affirm the lower court's decision, awarding the Appellee her 
costs of court in defending against this appeal. 
25
 892 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
26
 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
Page 1 of4 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment 
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard 
of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set 
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the 
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be 
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be 
a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief 
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unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a 
table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance 
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in 
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as 
part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the 
contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency 
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner 
and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as 
marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be 
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or 
portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-
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appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court 
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, 
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in 
the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised 
in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-
Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the 
Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good 
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this 
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional 
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven 
days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the 
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the 
draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to 
an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is 
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any 
number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by 
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either 
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter 
shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 
350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against 
the offending lawyer. 
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Advisory Committee Note. Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long 
held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate 
counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling 
duty..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" 
ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah 
App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 
1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-
39 (Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable 
standard of review and citation of supporting authority. 
http: //www.utcourts. go v/resources/rules/urap/URAP24 .html 7/1/2008 
ADDENDUM B 
Rixle 52 Page 1 of 1 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court 
adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except 
as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for 
a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question 
has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law 
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
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ADDENDUM C 
(*mi(n 
Bar^ •T. B-rnr-g P o a r H n g , u a r ff
 2 7 0 0 
Attorney for Respondent 
Address
 1 5 w< s < r e m p l e # 6 0 0 
Telephone Sa l t Lake C i ty , Utah S'41 01 
(801) 531-7870 
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRIE 
VS. 
BRUCE_£L 
C. ELOFF 
Petitioner, 
•RT.OFF 
Respondent 
Financial Declaration 
Civil No 
Judge 
Commissioner .Medley 
054905322 
-M 
Evans 
Name: 
Address: 
Soc. Sec. No. 
Occupation:^ 
Employer: 
T^rnrp TClnff 
2112 West 12015 South 
River tnn ; ntah 
^74,-ff?^?^ffR. 
Gpologi a t 
MWH Americas, Inc . 
Employer Address: 10 61 9 s . JnrriRn natpway 
_ Sa l t Lake C i tv . Utah 84095 
Number of exemptions claimed: j 
Rfrthdate: 7 /q / iosn 
STATEMENT OE INCOME. EXPENSES. ASSETS' P L I A B I L I T I E S ' 
1. GROSS MONTHLY INCOME from: 
Salary and wages, including commissions-, 
bonuses, overtime and allowances) 6 2 4 8 , 6 5 -
Pensions and retirement 
Social security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.) 
Child support from any prior marriage 
-1 . 
* PETITIONER'S 
I EXHIBIT 
Dividends and interest 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Crec 
Chai 
Rents 
All other sources: (Specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 
MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS: 
Federal income tax 
State income tax 
FICA 
Health insurance 
Life insurance 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 
401(k) 
Savings plan 
Credit union 
Other (specify) Medicare 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
NET MONTHLY INCOME: (Attach YTD 
pay stub and prior year W-2/taxTetuin) 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: 
Purpose In whose 
litor'sName ofdeht name 
sa T7i c a \7-i o = 
G r a n i t e C a r 
Home D e o o t H o u s e h o l d 
GM ^ Jisa N«€A^ V i s a 
TOTAL 
"Rf-nr'A 
. . E r u c e 
J B r u a e 
Bmr?p 
(? 
0 
$ 
s 
$ 
Balance 
-1 2 5 3 , 
_flfi.1.7. 
-SL3.&. 
n o p . 
6 2 4 8 . 6 6 
4 2 0 . 1 4 
3 4 9 . 7 5 
3 6 8 . 5 8 
81 . dR 
1 4 8 2 . ^ 6 
4 7 6 6 / & 0 
Monthly 
Payment 
5 7 •• 
JLL_ 
,70 
an 
ST1512 .51I 
1 0O flO i u L/ ;• U U 
.... 2 5 7 . 6 9 
1.00-.. 0-0 
{^381 . 9 6 
S 1339.ffq 
-2-
PROPERTY: 
(a) Real estate (if more than one parcel of real estate, attach sheet with 
identical information} 
Address 2112 West 12015 South 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
J u l y 2005 Date of acquisition 
Original cost $ 157,000 no 
Mortgage balance S 1 ?.?.r 353.47 
Mortgage holder paT1v of amori^ 
Monthly payment S_B3SLJL1 
ther liens $_ 
[.ienholder,- Wal l s Fargn 
?%fi?q,3i 
Monthly payment S -POO nn 
Current value $ 310,000.00 
Basis of valuation Appra i sa l by J e r r y Webber 
(b) Vehicles (Year, make & model) Value 
(c) Cash and deposit accounts (banks, savings &. 
loans, credit unions-savings and checking) 
Name of 
institution Account No. 
rhasf l 6 9 7 48560 5 
Balance 
owed 
2002 Cevv B l a z e r S-10 
*l9ft£ wi «5 5an Pi^Kup ••— -•- -
—1 -9-97 Coleman •  T r a i l e r 
$ 7 A 7 S 
500 
2300 
s flfii r > ^ 
55 
0 
Current 
balance 
3876,66 
Chase qi2^57g158 S 80.64-
Chase 2042569125 1928.32 
Chase 2042569224 303.96 
• O -
(d) Securities, stocks, bonds, mone}' 
market funds (other) 
Name of 
institution Account No. 
Current 
value 
S c o t t r a d s p>ft7ngmn ft Qmnn 
fi4onn Scottrade 2R1C)C)1S7 
Name of 
business 
Business interests 
Shares 
Current 
value 
NONE ft 
(f) Other assets (include value or equity) 
Household furniture — $5,000 
PROFIT SHARING OR RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
(If more than two accounts, attach sheet with identical information) 
Name of company/plan name MWH/?i^?iitr 
Plan representative,. F ide l i ty 
Address P . P . VOZ 5434 
C!inrirmafr-i
 r DH A R 7 R 0 - 5 4 ' 2 4 
Current value $4,000.00 
-4-
Name of company_ 
Plan representative. 
Address 
Current value. 
7. LIFE INSURANCE 
Policy Face 
Name of Company No. Amount Cash Value (if any) 
$ $ 
8. MONTHLY EXPENSES: 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) $ 1037.17 
Real property taxes (residence) included 
Real property msurance (residence) included 
Maintenance (residence) 400.00 
Food and household supplies 300.00 
Utilities: 
Electricity 50.00 
Natural gas fin/on 
Water 54.01 
Sewer 1 5 - 0 0 
Garbage Inc luded w/ Water 
Telephone 78,37 
Laundry and dry cleaning 10.00 
Clothing sn nn 
Medical 25^oo_ 
Dental 1 ' 5 - 0 0 
- > 
60.00 
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive 
liability, disability: excluding deductions 
from wages in item 2 above) 
Child care 
Payment of child support or alimony 
from prior marriage 1,500.00 
School 
Entertainment so.oo 
Gifts 7 5 , nn 
Donations 1 o.QQ 
Travel ?q. nn 
Auto expense 150.00 
Auto payments 257.69 
Installment payments (from item 4 above, 
not including above) 4S7_fiq 
Other expenses (specify) Mpflicai Reimb. 100.00 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES S ii?29_93 
STATE OF UTAH) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake} 
I swear under penalty of perjury that all of the information contained herein is 
true and correct. f •} <~f~$\i _ 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this// dagr k-Ju*^-^. 20 O? 
|jdS5*fc SUSAN L BOTTOMS 1 
\imm ra^ES? / 'No ta ry Public 
! ^ 5 F " S S H S S l J Residing in Salt Lake Comity, Utah 
My 6cB2rraSidn*Scpiresr" 
-6-
(Rcv. 3/01) 
ADDENDUM D 
1 income was up until this morning? 
2 A No. 
3 Q But your real gross income per month is more like 
4 6,700 per month; right? 
5 A For the last five months. 
6 Q Well, currently? That's what it is currently? 
7 A Not based on the hourly rate and the salary, no. 
8 Q But based on everything you get, bonuses and 
9 everything else added in and divided out? 
10 A For the last five months, yes. 
11 Q Okay. So, your financial declaration here, which 
12 shows you at 6,248 is--under-states your income by, what, 450, 
13 $50 0 a month? 
14 A Based on what? 
15 Q Well, based on the figure that we just agreed you 
16 really make, 6--what is it? 6,7 60 is the figure that you 
17 provided to us this morning? 
18 A That--the difference for the last five months, I'll 
19 agree, yes. 
20 Q Okay. All right. So, about--about $5 0 0 a month. 
21 So, these figures that you have on your financial declaration 
22 which is Exhibit 6--or 5, excuse me, for deductions from your 
23 pay, those aren't accurate? Or are they? Is this money that 
24 you get, this $5 0 0 a month you've been getting, is that bonus 
25 money that isn't taxed? Or--
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1 A You mean the difference between the--
2 Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
3 A That was overtime, while I worked in Romania--
4 Q Okay. 
5 A --in March. But I'm exempt, professionally exempt, 
6 so I don't get overtime, generally. 
7 Q Okay. So, this--so, the taxes--these taxes are 
8 going to remain the same; right? 
9 A Well, actually, if you want to use the 6,700 
10 figure--
11 Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
12 A --they should go up. 
13 Q Well, then--
14 A 'Cause that's based on the 6,2 00 figure. 
15 Q Okay. But you weren't actually taxed on this 
16 additional money; right? 
17 A Yes. I was. 
18 Q Okay. So, these-so, these deductions are not 
19 correct on the 6,760 figure? 
20 A No. They're under-stated, then. 
21 Q Okay. When do you expect you would--how much--how 
22 much additional tax do you think you'd pay on that extra $500? 
23 A I don't know. I'm not a tax accountant. I'd have 
24 to consult with my tax accountant. 
25 Q Okay. So, your net pay is really somewhere between 
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1 zero and $5 0 0 higher? 
2 A For the last five months? 
3 Q Yeah. 
4 A Well, just probably for the month of March when I 
5 was in Romania, because that's where the overtime was. 
6 Q I see. Do you ever--do you ever work overtime 
7 besides in Romania? 
8 A We are short-handed at work and I've had to go out 
9 in the field, which I am not really supposed to do, I'm a 
10 project manager, but we had to cover and there was a few hours 
11 in the last month, maybe five, total. 
12 Q Let's go to Page 4 of your financial declaration 
13 there in the exhibits that you have in front of you, Mr. 
14 Eloff, if you would. You have--you have a thousand and, 
15 roughly, thirty dollars a month as your mortgage payment; 
16 right? 
17 A Are you--you said Page 4. 
18 Q I'm sorry. 
19 A Are you referring to a different page? 
20 Q It may be Page--let's see,--
21 A Page 5? 
22 Q Page 5. It depends on whose printer you printed 
23 off. Yeah. 
24 A thousand--a thousand and thirty--a thousand 
25 thirty-seven, you--the number's changed just a little bit 
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